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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE MEANING AND SCOPE
OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION'S "DIGNITY"
CLAUSE WITH POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS*
Matthew 0. Clifford**

Thomas P. Huff***

INTRODUCTION

In its landmark decision, Gryczan v. State,' the Montana
Supreme Court found Montana's deviate sexual conduct statute
unconstitutional because it intruded upon Montanans' right to
privacy explicitly guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights,
Article II, Section 10, of the Montana Constitution. As the court
concluded:
Montana's constitutional right of privacy-this right of personal
autonomy and right to be let alone-includes the right of
consenting adults, regardless of gender, to engage in noncommercial, private, sexual relations 2 free of governmental
interference, intrusion and condemnation.

In addition to its Section 10 guarantee of privacy, Article II
also includes a guarantee of individual dignity. This guarantee

* The authors would like to thank Professors Bari Burke, Larry Elison, Steve
Kramer, Fritz Snyder; Attorney Scott Fisk; students Bethany Graham and Scott

Manning; and the members of the Spring 2000, Montana State Constitutional Law
Seminar at the University of Montana Law School for helpful suggestions on earlier

drafts of this paper. All errors that remain are ours.
** B.A., 1988, Northern Arizona University; J.D. 1995, University of Montana
School of Law. Conservation Director/Staff Attorney, Clark Fork Coalition, Missoula,
Montana. Former Law Clerk to United States District Court Judge Donald Molloy.
*** Professor of Philosophy and Lecturer in Law, University of Montana; B.A.
1964, University of Colorado; Ph.D. 1968, Rice University.
1. 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997).
2. Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 456, 942 P.2d at 126.
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3
avows: "The dignity of the human being is inviolable."
Interestingly, this dignity clause, which was discussed in some
detail in the briefs of the parties and amici in Gryczan,4 received
no attention from the court in its opinion. 5 We believe this is
unfortunate, but entirely understandable. The Montana
Constitution's dignity clause is unusual, 6 and its meaning,
scope, and legal significance are not, at first glance, obvious or
clear.
There are, however, hints that some members of the current
court, at least, might be inclined to find substantive meaning in
the dignity clause. For example, in 1993, Justice Trieweiler in
7
his dissent in Stratemeyer v. MACO Workers' Comp. Trust
spoke generally about the clause:

The language in Article II, Section 4 of Montana's Constitution is
simple plain, and clear. It provides that "[tihe dignity of the
human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied equal
protection of the laws." Yet, the purpose served by that language
in any society based on equality is absolutely vital. It recognizes
that majoritarian rule can at times be harsh, intolerant, and
unfair. It recognizes that at times a basic framework of principle
is necessary to prevent those with political
influence from
8
oppressing those without political influence.

More recently in 1998, Justice Nelson, in a special concurrence
in Girard v. Williams,9 wrote more specifically:
Under our Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 15, children
enjoy the same fundamental rights as adults. At a bare minimum
these include inalienable rights to a clean and healthful
environment, to pursue life's basic necessities, to enjoy a safe,
healthy, and happy life (Article II, Section 3) and to basic human
dignity (Article II, Section 4). 10

Neither of these references to the dignity clause, however, make

3. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
4. See Brief of the Respondent at 37-44, Gryczan (No. 96-202); Brief of the
Women's Law Caucus at 2-5, 10-12, Gryczan (No. 96-202). See also Brief of the
Appellant at 18-22, Gryczan (No. 96-202). Tom Huffs interest in the dignity clause was
piqued by Deirdre Runnette's thoughtful work on the brief for the Women's Law Caucus.
5.
Indeed, having concluded that the deviate sexual conduct statute, Mont. Code
Ann. § 45-5-505, violated the Montana Constitution's right to privacy provision, the
Montana Supreme Court explicitly declined to address the dignity clause. Gryczan, 283
Mont. at 438, 942 P.2d at 115.
6. Though the Montana Constitution's dignity clause is unusual, it is not unique.
See, e.g. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1.
7. 259 Mont. 147, 155, 855 P.2d 506, 511-12 (1993).
8. Id.
9. 291 Mont. 49, 75, 966 P.2d 1155, 1171 (1998).
10. Id.
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clear its meaning. Indeed, unlike the constitutional right to
privacy, the court has yet to develop the meaning of this clause
in any of its opinions."
It is our purpose in this article to clarify the meaning of the
dignity clause by appealing to the structure and language of
Montana's Constitution, the philosophical background of the
Constitutional Convention's ideals, and the historical record of
the Convention itself; and then to recommend a strategy for
limiting the scope and, therefore, the legal application of this
quite remarkable provision. We conclude that the dignity clause
expresses a fundamental, if quite ordinary, ideal of postReformation, Western ethical and political thought. This ideal
provides that human beings have dignity because they have
intrinsic worth as individuals, and their dignity is found, in one
form or another, in their capacity to live self-directed and
responsible lives. To say, as the Montana Constitution does,
that "[t]he dignity of the human being is inviolable" 12 is thus to
assert that the intrinsic worth, the basic humanity, of persons
may not be violated.
I. THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE DIGNITY PROVISION

A. The Structure of Article II, Section 4
The dignity clause of the Montana Constitution is found in
Article II, Section 4. This provision reads, in full:
Section 4. INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY. The dignity of the human
being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or
institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of
his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture,
social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.

At first glance, the structure of this section might seem
perplexing. As can be seen, the section consists of three distinct
clauses 13 whose exact relationship to each other is not

11. Two earlier, independent references to the dignity clause by Justice Shea
similarly fail to develop the meaning of this clause: State v. Meadors, 177 Mont. 100,
111, 580 P.2d 903, 909 (1978)(dissenting opinion) and Oberg v. City of Billings, 207
Mont. 277, 285, 674 P.2d 494, 497-98 (1983). (For a less independent reading of the
Dignity Clause see note 125, infra.)
12. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
13. Throughout this article, we will refer to the whole of Article II, Section 4 as the
"dignity provision," in light of its title. We will refer to the individual sentences
contained within the dignity provision as the "dignity clause," the "equal protection
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immediately obvious. The first clause is a simple and forceful
declaration of the value of human dignity. This is hardly
surprising, because, after all, individual dignity is the title of the
section. It seems curious, however, that this rather broad
reference is the only explicit mention of the word "dignity" in the
entire section. The second clause, familiar enough to legallytrained readers, is an equal protection clause essentially
identical to the one contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The third clause, which we will
call the "anti-discrimination clause," appears to be an extension
of the theme of equal protection. It prohibits anyone from
discriminating on the basis of certain defined categories. These
include familiar categories such as race and sex, but also extend
to less familiar ones such as social condition and political
ideas.14
Any attempt to make some sense of the two references to
"dignity" in Article II, Section 4, immediately faces several
questions. First and foremost, what is the relationship between
the concept of human dignity which is expressed in the title and
first clause, and the concept of human equality which is
expressed in the second two clauses? Second, why does the
Section 4 provision have both an equal protection clause and an
anti-discrimination clause?
After all, the right to equal
protection and the right to be free from arbitrary discrimination
are normally considered to be the same thing. Third, do the
broad references to dignity and equality in the first two clauses
add anything to the specific prohibitions set forth in the third
clause? Or should the third, anti-discrimination clause be
considered the only part of the provision with any practical,
effective meaning that can be applied in individual cases?
At first blush, it might appear tempting to ignore the first
two clauses and concentrate on the third. After all, it will
certainly be much easier, in practice, to determine whether
persons have suffered discrimination based on the narrowlydrawn categories of race, sex, or political ideas than to
determine whether their more nebulous right to "equal
protection of the laws" has been violated. And of course, it will
be harder still to determine whether "dignity" has been violated.
clause," and the "anti-discrimination clause," respectively.
14. The anti-discrimination clause is also uncommonly broad in its reach-it
prohibits discrimination both by the state and by private persons and entities (thereby
avoiding the "state action limitation" of the Fourteenth Amendment). See The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
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After all, when assessing an equal protection claim, a court can
at least look to the rather extensive body of case law
interpreting the federal and state equal protection clauses for
guidance. But in assessing a dignity claim, there would seem to
be no obvious legal sources to which a court could turn, beyond
the bare word "dignity" itself. Surely it would be much easier to
treat the title and first two clauses of the dignity provision as
mere precatory language-as constitutional "window dressing" so
to speak-and treat the third clause as the only portion of the
provision with substantive legal force.
Tempting though it might seem, this option is foreclosed to
us.
One of our oldest and most venerable canons of
constitutional interpretation tells us that we must, if at all
possible, treat each separate clause of a constitution as both
substantively meaningful and not redundant. 15 This principle
surely applies with particular force to words which, like
"individual dignity," comprise the actual title of the section
being interpreted. Daunting though the task may be, we believe
Montana courts are compelled, when presented with the
appropriate facts, to make some attempt to determine the
substantive meaning of the dignity clause.
We would like to propose an alternative and, we think, more
defensible reading of Article II, Section 4, a reading that gives
meaning to all three clauses. As we see it, the language of the
dignity provision moves in a logical progression from the general
to the specific. 16 The title of the provision itself is "Individual
Dignity;" thus, we must presume that all the language in the
provision treats this topic in some respect. The first sentence,
the dignity clause, obviously addresses dignity by declaring that
human dignity is inviolable. The second sentence, we believe,
goes on to declare one way in which human dignity can be
violated-by denying someone the equal protection of the law
15. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be presumed that
any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect"); State v. State Highway
Comm'n, 89 Mont. 205, 211, 296 P. 1033, 1035 (1931) ("In expounding a constitutional
provision it is our duty to give meaning to every word, phrase, clause and sentence
therein, if it is possible so to do").
16. Unfortunately, the convention record does not provide a clear defense of this,
or for that matter, any other reading of the structure of the dignity provision or of the
meaning of the three clauses in relation to one another. Much of what record there is
focuses on far more specific issues like the inclusion of women and private action in the
anti-discrimination clause. Our reading of the structure of the provision rests on the
language and structure of the text, the meaning of which must have seemed clear, if
unanalyzed, by the convention delegates. Our discussion of the convention record can be
found in Part II, infra.
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based on some sort of arbitrary classification.
Our legal
tradition has long recognized such classifications as affronts to
the dignity of persons. In Brown v. Board of Education,17 for
instance, what the United States Supreme Court clearly found
wrong with segregated schools, even if they were materially
equal, was that segregation itself failed to respect the dignity of
African-American children. Indeed, racial segregation degraded
them by failing to treat them as equals.
The Court
acknowledged this explicitly, citing social science studies
showing that African-American children internalized that
degradation.' 8 They thought of themselves less worthwhile as
human beings, as we might say, lacking the dignity of White
children.
The third sentence of Article 4, the anti-discrimination
clause, we believe, fleshes out the meaning of the equal
protection right by enumerating certain types of classifications
which the authors of the dignity provision believed to be
arbitrary: race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, and
political/religious ideas.
But this cannot be read as an
exhaustive list of all possible arbitrary, and therefore prohibited,
classifications. If this list were exhaustive, the equal protection
clause in the second sentence would be mere surplusage. By
including this separate, more general equal protection clause in
Section 4, the framers presumably intended to leave open the
possibility that there are other prohibited classifications beyond
those which were recognized at that point in history. 19
By the same logic, and more central to the topic of this
paper, the inclusion of a more general prohibition against the
violation of human dignity in the first clause of Section 4, we
believe, leaves open the possibility that human dignity can be
violated in ways that do not involve some sort of arbitrary
classification. 20 Indeed, it would seem that in order to give
distinct and independent meaning to the dignity clause,
17. 347 U.S. 483(1954).
18. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.1l.
19. It is not difficult to think of examples of what such additional classifications
might be. For example, in the twenty or so years following the adoption of the Montana
Constitution, it gradually became an accepted norm of our society that persons ought not
be discriminated against on the basis of disability. See Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336.
20. This would also be consistent with the structure of the provision. If the equal
protection and anti-discrimination clauses were read to exhaust human dignity, then the
dignity clause would be mere surplusage, because the title "Individual Dignity" would be
sufficient to make that point.
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when there is a violation of the dignity of persons that does not
reflect the forms of unequal treatment or invidious
discrimination prohibited by the two subsequent clauses.
Presumably anyone could experience such a violation of dignity,
21
not just persons who are members of protected classes.
B. PlainMeaning
What, then, does it mean to violate the dignity of a human
being? Thus far, we have simply argued that a reasonable
construction of Section 4's structure and language suggests that
the dignity clause must refer to treatment violative of
individual, human dignity beyond that protected by the equal
protection and non-discrimination clauses. So what does it
mean to violate the dignity of a human being?
In our Western ethical tradition, especially after the
Religious Reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries, dignity has
typically been associated with the normative ideal of individual
persons as intrinsically valuable, as having inherent worth as
individuals, at least in part because of their capacity for
independent, autonomous, rational, and responsible action. 22
Persons, understood as intrinsically valuable because of their
capacity for sovereign control over their own lives, 23 claim our
respect, and that respect is typically expressed in law through
rights to both liberty and fair treatment. Everyone, for example,
deserves due process of law. Even persons who have committed
heinous crimes deserve due process, because we respect their
worth, their dignity as human beings. Similarly, no persons
deserve different treatment simply because of their race or
gender. Such treatment fails to honor their intrinsic worth as
human beings, degrading them by reducing them to contingent
features of their humanity, such as their race or gender.
Treatment which degrades or demeans persons, that is,
treatment which deliberately reduces the value of persons, and
which fails to acknowledge their worth as persons, directly
violates their dignity. But persons' dignity could also be more

21. As we will explain, the dignity clause might also be understood to supplement
the application of equal protection as well as other rights in the Declaration of Rights.
See infra text accompanying notes 114-118, 126-137.
22. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 4647, 53 (Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1959) (1785).
23. "Free and equal rational beings," Kant would say. Id.
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indirectly violated whenever they are denied the opportunity to
direct or control their own lives in such a way that their worth is
questioned or dishonored. 24 This occurs, for example, any time
an important liberty is denied. 25 But it could occur in other
circumstances as well, as when the loss of autonomy undermines
the fundamental conditions of a self-directed life. 2 6 Similarly,
dignity may be indirectly, but more subtly, undermined by
treatment which is paternalistic-treating adults like children
incapable of making autonomous choices for themselves, or by
trivializing what choices they do make about how to live their
27
lives.
In summary, the meaning of the concept of individual
human dignity, in traditional Western ethics, imagines human
beings as intrinsically worthy of respect, of having dignity,
because of their capacity to live self-directed and responsible
lives. Dignity may be directly assailed by treatment which
degrades, demeans, debases, disgraces, or dishonors persons, or
it may be more indirectly undermined by treatment which either
interferes with self-directed and responsible lives or which
trivializes the choices persons make for their own lives.
C. The HistoricalOriginsof The Meaning of Dignity
1. Brief CulturalHistory
The historical origins of this, by now quite commonplace,
conception of human dignity can be found in large part both in
the Religious Reformation's conception of the capacity of
individuals to achieve salvation through good works, without the
mediation of the Roman Catholic Church, and in the 18th
century Enlightenment's optimism about the capacity of
individuals to carry on rational, self-directed lives and to act
responsibly and reasonably in their relations with others in a

24. Our use of the term "indirectly" is not meant to suggest that these violations of
dignity are less serious or important than "direct" violations.
25. See infra notes 114-118, 126-137 and accompanying text (discussing what we
call the "complementary application" of the dignity right.)
26. For an illustration of this, see infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the right to
physician-assisted suicide).
27. Analogously, we sometimes even say that persons can act in ways which fail to
respect their own dignity, as in "it was beneath her dignity to lie" or "his submissive
behavior failed to show a proper dignity," or we may compliment persons by saying they
have "maintained their dignity despite grinding poverty."
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Prior to the Religious Reformation of the 16th and 17th
centuries in Europe, political organization (the state) was
justified by an appeal to a widely shared, comprehensive
religious morality-that of the Roman Catholic Church. When
the Religious Reformation challenged the Church's authority
over the truth of its particular version of Christian morality, the
authority of the Church's religious morality as the foundation for
political organization was also challenged. 29 Central to the
Reformation's challenge to the Roman Church's authority over
government was the often optimistic belief, widespread in the
Reformed, Protestant churches, about the value and capacities
of individual persons. The Church's justification for the use of
state power to enforce religious belief rested on the somewhat
less optimistic belief that individuals needed the structure, the
institutions, and the practices of the church, as well as the
coercive power of the state to reinforce those practices, in order
to instill sufficient virtue in persons to make possible their
salvation. 30 Indeed, it was, in part, the Church's reliance on
state power to enforce Church doctrine, in the face of the
changes proposed by the reformers, that led to such
fundamental principles of the liberal state as individual liberty,
including religious tolerance, and the doctrines of democratic
government. 31
As the great political philosophers of the 17th and 18th
centuries, such as Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, and Kant,
attempted to explain and justify the emerging secular state in
Europe, they developed a number of ideas which shaped the
modern, liberal ideal of justified government. From Hobbes
came the idea of government as a contract amongst autonomous
and self-interested persons seeking the order and security of
government over the chaos and danger of the "state of nature."32
28. See Hans Riess, Introduction to KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 1, 6 (Hans Reiss
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1971).
29. See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFoRD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4-5 (1987).
30. See John Rawls, Domain of the Political and the Idea of the Overlapping
Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 233, 235 (1989). For a detailed example of the Roman
Church's view, see THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 184-240 (Henry Paolucci
ed., Regnery Gateway 1962).
31. See generally JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (James Tully
ed., Hackett Pub. Co., Inc. 1983) (1689).
32. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, PARTS I AND H 107 (Bobbs-Merrill 1958)
(1651). For a discussion of Hobbes' view, see Rawls, supra note 30, at 2.
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On Hobbes' view, government could be founded and justified
even in the absence of any shared morality simply on the
prudential, self-interest of individual persons. 33 Such a state
should be understood as an artificial human creation established
by an act of positive law-making, providing for order and
34
security.
By contrast, both Locke and Bentham attempted to offer a
foundation for these emerging states in new, post-Reformation
moralities. For Locke, in the 17th century, that new political
morality could be found in the doctrines of God-given "natural
rights" which justified the claims to the liberty, security, and
property of individuals prior to the creation of a state, and which
the state must protect in order to be morally justified and
stable.35 For Bentham, late in the 18th century, the secular
comprehensive morality of utilitarianism (which requires that
happiness, as specified by each individual person, be maximized)
could justify government authority. 36 Government, according to
Bentham, must accept the good of happiness, as decided by each
individual, and pursue the utility-maximizing strategy of
attempting to generate with public policy the greatest net sum
37
of happiness.
From Kant, in the 18th century, came a fuller and more
secular articulation and justification for the ideal of individual
rights than had been offered by Locke. For Kant, the concept of
the individual as capable of rational, self-directed, and
responsible action, logically required our respect, and that
respect must be expressed politically, in rights guaranteeing the
liberties necessary for the realization of this distinctively human
capacity for autonomous, moral action. 38
All of these 17th and 18th century political ideas ultimately
played a role inthe formation of our modern liberal state. From
Hobbes, and from the experience of colonial charters, came the
idea of constitution-making. From Locke, too, came the idea of
33. See Hobbes, supra note 32, at 112.
34. See id. at 115.
35. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 5-6, 70-73 (Thomas
Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1952) (1690).
36. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 3
(Hafner Press 1948) (1789). For a discussion of classical utilitarianism see JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19-24 (1999).
37. See BENTHAM, supra note 36, at 1-3.
38. See IMMANUEL KANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS, On the Common Saying: 'This May
Be True In Theory, But It Does Not Apply In Practice, at 74-77 (Hans Reiss ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1971).
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constitution-making, but also came the right of revolution (best
articulated in the Declaration of Independence); the principles of
limited government; and the idea of a bill of rights, including the
right to private property. From Bentham, especially in the 19th
century, came the justification for the development of the role of
democratic government, especially in the states, to exercise the
police power in pursuit of the general welfare. Finally, from
Kant, and certain liberal strands of the Protestant tradition,
came the ideals of tolerance, justice, and fairness expressed in
the abolitionist and women's suffrage movements and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Also from
Kant, in particular, came the modern Supreme Court's analysis
of the rights of conscience in our bill of rights as respecting the
autonomy and dignity of persons. Without entering more deeply
into these philosophical theories, we want to emphasize that,
while these four principal political thinkers of the postReformation tradition disagreed regarding the details of the role
dignity and autonomy should play in the analysis of political
institutions, each, in his own way, justified the modern liberal
state by appealing to the significance of individuals and the
importance of respect for their choices or preferences. 39
The widely shared political ideal of the inviolability of
human dignity is, thus, implicit in much of the emerging liberal
democratic tradition after the Reformation. It is this ideal, so
essential to our notion of limited government, which we believe
the framers of the 1972 Montana Constitution would most
naturally have had in mind for the dignity clause.
Some evidence for just how commonplace this particular
conception of human dignity was in the last half of the 20th
century, and just what role it would most naturally have been
39. These differences in the conceptions of individual autonomy and dignity often
reflect the distinctive theoretical concerns of the particular post-Reformation
philosopher. For example, Bentham, a utilitarian, would have viewed the dignity of
persons as assured when the market-like preferences of specific individuals are counted
and respected. On the other hand, Kant, a deontologist, identified dignity with more
abstract characteristics, like the capacity for autonomy, not peculiar to specific
individuals, but rather common to all individuals. Thus, respect for persons' dignity, for
Kant, focuses on those traits they share as humans, while respect for the value of
persons for Bentham focuses on counting as equally valuable the distinctive preferences
which people express as specific individuals.
The post-Reformation philosophers did share, however, a conception of dignity
that focused on the intrinsic dignity of persons rather than the dignity that persons
achieve through their accomplishments or their virtues. This latter, more perfectionistic
view characterized some pre-Reformation political ideas, especially those of the ancient
Greek political philosophers Plato and Aristotle.
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understood to play as an ideal of our political tradition when the
Montana Constitution was written, can be easily seen not only
in our everyday political rhetoric, 40 but also in United States
Supreme Court opinions written during this period.
2. The Dignity Concept in Selected United States Supreme Court
Opinions, 1965-1992
The concept of human dignity, as we have suggested, is a
widely shared and seminal ideal of Western moral and political
thought. Indeed, a principal purpose of liberal democratic states
is to protect the dignity of their citizens, to assure citizens are
honored by guaranteeing their autonomy and protecting them
against degradation. This notion of "dignity" can be found in
ordinary uses of this concept by the United States Supreme
Court.
In 1965, in Rosenblatt v. Baer,41 a case addressing the
question whether a newspaper's impersonal attack on the fiscal
management of a county recreation area could be used to
establish defamation of those administering such an area,
Justice Stewart wrote:
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.

The protection of private personality, like the protection of life
itself, is left to the individual states ....
But this does not mean
that this right is entitled to any less
recognition
by this Court as a
42
basic of our constitutional system.

In 1969, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 43 Justice Brennan spoke for
the Court in recognizing the due process right of welfare
recipients to pre-termination evidentiary hearings to help
protect against arbitrary treatment by welfare bureaucrats. He
noted: "From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has
been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its
borders."" Similarly, Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court in
1971 in Cohen v. California,45 held that the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech for a Vietnam war protestor whose

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

For example, dignity is often used in right-to-die and civil rights discussions.
383 U.S. 75 (1965).
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (emphasis added).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-65 (emphasis added).
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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jacket read "Fuck the Draft" derived from "the belief that no
other approach would comport with the premise of individual
46
dignity and choice upon which our political system rests."

More recently, in the context of a state requirement of
artificial nutrition and hydration to maintain life support for an
individual in a permanent vegetative state, Justice O'Connor
wrote in her concurrence:
Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures against
her will burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to
determine the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the
liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it
protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to
reject medical treatment, including artificial delivery of food and
47
water.

Finally, in the context of its most important recent abortion
decision, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, in Planned
Parenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey,48 said:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education. Carey v. Population
Services International,431 U.S. at 685. Our cases recognize "the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted
governmental intrusion
into matters
so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra, at 453 (emphasis in
original). Our precedents "have respected the private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter." Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of

liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes 49of
personhood were they formed under the compulsion of the State.

In each of these uses of "dignity," the Court assumes that
the dignity of persons is a central, foundational ideal of our
political tradition closely allied to our ideals of liberty and
autonomy.
Respect for dignity affirms the worth of the
individual as capable of making autonomous decisions regarding

46. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
47. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
48. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
49. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (emphasis added).
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what to say,50 what medical care to accept or reject, 5 1 or whether
to bear a child;52 or it protects the individual from degradation
by an attack on reputation 53 or by the arbitrary treatment of
government agents.5 4 In none of these cases is the Court's
reference to "dignity" arcane or mysterious. Indeed, it is clear
from the context of each use that the Court considers human
dignity a core ideal of our political ethics, an ideal "on which our
political system rests" 55 or an ideal "central to the liberty
56
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Because this conception of dignity is such a pervasive
feature of our shared ethical tradition, especially as we
articulate it in the last half of the 20th century, and because it
fits so well the structure and apparent purpose of Section 4, it is
hard to imagine what else the framers of the 1972 Montana
Constitution could have meant by it. 5 7 As it turns out, what
little historical record we find in the Montana Constitutional
Convention materials, of the concept of human dignity, suggests
that the delegates' intent was indeed consistent with this
ordinary and traditional meaning of dignity in our Western
58
ethical tradition.
II.

THE ORIGINS OF MONTANA'S DIGNITY CLAUSE-THE
CONVENTION RECORD.

A. The Convention Process
The constitutional convention, with the goal of rewriting or
replacing Montana's 1889 constitution, was called by a vote of
the people of the state in 1971.
In preparation for the
convention, the legislature, recognizing the need for "historical,
legal, and comparative information about the Montana
50. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
51. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289.
52. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
53. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966).
54. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
55. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
56. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
57. See infra Part II.B, C.
58. We note that the convention delegates were remarkably prescient in their
understanding of the reach of the traditional conception of dignity. They presumed that
women and Native Americans fell within the protections of the dignity provision. Thus,
while the delegates' intent draws on the ordinary meaning of dignity in our tradition, the
delegates appeared to understand the scope of its application to be quite broad.
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Constitution,"59
"created the Constitutional Convention
6
0
Commission."
The Commission, with the help of its staff,
drafted a series of numbered "studies" which were submitted to
the delegates to prepare for the convention itself. These studies
often reveal both the sources and the ideals at play in the
convention deliberations.
The convention delegates were elected in November 1971,
and they began their deliberations on January 17, 1972,
completing their work on March 24, 1972.61 The delegates to the
convention worked in drafting committees preparing the various
articles of the constitution, and the committees submitted draft
articles to the convention, meeting as a committee of the
whole. 62 Any delegate could propose any provision for the new
constitution, and delegate proposals were routinely referred to
the appropriate drafting committee. 63
Each draft article,
prepared by its drafting committee, could, of course, be modified
by amendment after it was submitted to the convention, meeting
as a committee of the whole.64 After debate and amendment, the
convention itself would adopt the article. 65 The article would
then be transmitted to the Committee on Style, Drafting,
Transition, and Submission which might rearrange or refine the
language for purposes of coherence and style, and the revised
article would be ultimately approved in its final form by the
66
convention.
The delegates submitted their final draft of the new
constitution to a vote of Montana citizens on June 6, 1972, and
this new constitution, as approved by the voters, went into effect
on June 20, 1972.67 After a brief, unsuccessful, legal challenge
to the voting process, the provisions of the new constitution were
implemented (over the next two years) according to the
transition schedule provided in the constitution. 68

59. Montana Constitutional Convention 1971-1972, Study No. 10: Bill of Rights, at
iii [hereinafter, RIGHTS STUDY].

60.

Id.

61. See 1 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, at vi (1982).
[hereinafter CONVENTION RECORD].
62. See id. at ii. Committee proposals are found in 1 CONVENTION RECORD, at 333544, and 2 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANsCRIPTS, at 547-836 (1982).

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See
See
See
See
See
See

1 CONVENTION RECORD, at 75-332.
1 CONVENTION RECORD, at ii.
id.
id.
id. at vi.
id.
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B. The Convention Record of the Dignity Provision
The dignity clause, as it was ultimately approved by the
voters of Montana, followed this drafting pattern. The clause
first appeared in the Bill of Rights Study prepared by the
Commission staff.69 This study included a general historical and
philosophical discussion of the idea of constitutional rights, a
discussion and justification for a wide range of rights which
might be included in the draft constitution, and, in its
appendices, sample bills of rights and selected individual rights
provisions.
How, then, did the dignity clause come to be included in the
1972 Montana Constitution?
There were seven delegate
proposals which included provisions addressing dignity, equal
protection, or anti-discrimination.70 Two of those proposals, 33
and 61, referred explicitly to dignity. Proposal 61, introduced by
Richard Champoux, and co-signed by four other delegates, read
as follows:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the law, nor be discriminated
against in the exercise of his civil or political rights or in the choice
of housing or conditions of employment on account of race, color,
sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas,
by any person, firm, corporation, or institution; or by the state or
71
any agency or subdivision of the state.

This proposal was adopted by the Bill of Rights Committee,
without change 72 and submitted to the convention as Article II,
Section 4, "INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY."73 After a brief discussion
of an amendment which would have eliminated the words: "by
any person, firm, or corporation or institution" in the antidiscrimination clause (that failed), the convention delegates,
acting as a committee of the whole, adopted this provision by a
74
unanimous voice vote.
Subsequently, the Committee on Style, Drafting, Transition,
and Submission rearranged the language of Section 4,75 and that
69. The RIGHTS STUDY was prepared by Rick Applegate, research analyst on the
Commission staff, and approved and published by the Commission's Research
Subcommittee on the Bill of Rights.
70. See Delegate Proposal Numbers 10, 32, 33, 50, 51, 61, & 165, 1 CONVENTION
RECORD, at 94, 126, 127, 148, 149, 161, 312.
71. Delegate Proposal Number 61, 1 CONVENTION RECORD, at 161.
72. See 2 CONVENTION RECORD, supra note 61, at 658.
73. See 5 CONVENTION RECORD, supra note 61, at 1642.
74. Id. at 1646.
75. See 2 CONVENTION RECORD, supra note 61, at 962.
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revised language was adopted by the convention with almost no
discussion. 76 The final version thus read:
Section 4. INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY. The dignity of the human
being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or
institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of
his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex,
culture,
77
social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.

We find nothing in the drafting or adoption record,
including the very limited debate, which would indicate any sort
of novel or radical meaning for the dignity clause. Apparently
its ordinary meaning as a principal ideal of our ethical tradition
naturally associated with equal protection and nondiscrimination was obvious to the delegates. Indeed, in the only
formal "Comment" by the Bill of Rights Committee on the entire
dignity provision, the committee never mentions the dignity
clause, focusing instead on its "intent of providing a
Constitutional impetus for the eradication of public and private
discriminations based on race, color, sex, culture, social origin or
condition, or political or religious ideas."7 8 In the course of the
only debate over the adoption of Section 4 (a brief discussion
which focused on the inclusion of "private action" in the
prohibition on discrimination) Delegate Dahood, defending the
scope of the proposed provision, did explicitly refer to dignity,
stating: "[tihe intent of Section 4 is simply to provide that every
individual in the State of Montana, as a citizen of this state,
may pursue his inalienable rights without having any shadows
79
cast upon his dignity through unwarranted discrimination."
Similarly, Delegate Proposal No. 33, the only other proposal that
explicitly referred to dignity,80 referred to dignity in a manner
analogous to Delegate Dahood's remark. It read: "The rights of
individual dignity, privacy, and free expression being essential
to the well-being of a free society, the state shall not infringe
upon these rights without a showing of a compelling state

76. See 7 CONVENTION RECORD, supra note 61, at 2477. A brief discussion clarified
that the deletion of reference to "agencies and subdivisions" of the state by the drafting

committee simply reflected the judgment of the committee that these subdivisions of the
state were, by definition, a part of the state.
77. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
78. 2 CONVENTION RECORD, supra note 61, at 628. This 'Comment" only
incidentally mentions the equal protection clause, as well.
79. 5 CONVENTION RECORD, supra note 61, at 1643.
80. See 1 CONVENTION RECORD, supra note 61, at 127 (not adopted).
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interest."8 ' Both of these latter two references treat human
dignity as an interest independent of, but connected to, the
interests of persons in fundamental liberties and their interests
in protection against degrading discrimination-precisely the
82
ordinary use of the concept of dignity in our ethical tradition.
C. The Convention Studies
The concept of human dignity also appears, explicitly, three
times in the Bill of Rights Study. First, at the conclusion of an
early section titled "Are States' Bills of Rights Necessary?" the
Commission's study quoted a law review article from
constitutional scholar, Professor Arval Morris of the University
of Washington Law School, as part of the Commission's
argument for the significance and importance of states' bills of
rights. In this context, Professor Morris said:
It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the importance of the role to
be played by the state Bill of Rights during the next 100 years ....
To be truly fundamental and meaningful any new Bill of Rights
must aim for two goals: (1) preserving that enduring heritage of
the past that has served us well, and (2) anticipate the
fundamental trends of the future and safeguard human dignity
83
and liberty for that era.

Second, in a later section on the historical and philosophical
foundations for a bill of rights, the Commission's study
addressed the idea of inalienable rights. Seeking to distinguish
between rights that flow from positive law (that are merely
artificial, human creations) and inalienable rights (that inhere
in individual persons as a matter of moral right prior to the
formation of a state, and may not, therefore, be taken away by
the state),8 4 the study quoted Immanual Kant's Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals:
[Elverything has either a value or worth. What has value has a
substance which can replace it as its equivalent; but whatever is,
on the other hand, exalted above all values, and thus lacks an
equivalent.... has no merely relative value, that is, a price, but

81.

Id.

82. The analysis presented here of these two references to the dignity concept, in
the debate and in Proposal 33, benefitted from Scott Manning's term paper, Death with
Dignity in Montana, submitted to meet the advanced writing requirement in the Elder
Law Seminar at the University of Montana Law School (1999), which Manning

generously shared with us.
83. RIGHTS STUDY, supra note 59, at 59 n.37 (quoting Arval Morris, New Horizons
for a State Bill of Rights, 45 WASH. L. REV. 453, 485-86 (1970)).
84. See RIGHTS STUDY, supra note 59, at 82.
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rather an inner worth, that is, dignity.

The study, after describing this rather obscure passage as a
"typically amazing insight,"8 6 focused on the value/worth
distinction to explain the distinction between rights that flow
from positive law and rights that are inalienable.8 7 The point
the study made is that the inclusion of inalienable (moral) rights
in a constitution would express this foundational insight from
Western moral philosophy about the intrinsic (inner) worth, and,
therefore, dignity of persons.
In the quoted passage, Kant is focusing on that seminal
insight of post-Reformation political thought-that the value of
human beings is not relative, but intrinsic, and may not,
therefore, be traded for some other value. Human beings are, in
other words, inviolable; and such beings, beings who have this
intrinsic, inner worth, have dignity, not mere value. According
to the study, inalienable rights, if included in the Montana
Constitution, would not simply be created by the act of
constitution-making; rather their presence in a new constitution
would express, and reflect, this cardinal moral insight about the
worth, and thus dignity, of persons from our ethical tradition.
As we have noted, the dignity clause actually appears in the
constitution in Article II, Section 4, titled "INDIVIDUAL
DIGNITY." The general discussion of the subject matter of this
section in the Bill of Rights Study occurs in Chapter 10, "New
Provisions." This part of the study never explicitly refers to
human dignity. However, after discussing provisions in the
1889 Constitution regarding the rights of aliens to own mining
property and the prohibition on slavery, the study offers two
brief discussions under the subtitles of "Equal Protection of the

85. Id. (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS,
in ROUSSEAU, KANT, AND GOETHE 11 (Ernest Cassirer, trans., Harper Torchbooks 1945)
(1785)).
86.

RIGHTS STUDY, supra note 59, at 82.

87. See id. at 82-83. Kant's purpose in this passage is to explain that only human
beings, to the extent they are capable of acting as autonomous members of an ethical
community, have inner worth or dignity. For Kant, the inner worth or dignity of each
human being is found in the rational capacity to treat other human beings as ends and
not as means (in other words to act "ethically" or "on principle"), and that every human
being, having this rational capacity, has a right to claim of all other human beings
exactly this same (ethical) treatment. To have dignity, in Kant's sometimes obscure
manner of speaking, means to be an end to oneself, not an instrument of others, and to
be thereby, duty-bound to respect others as ends in themselves. The capacity for ethical
self-determination, in short, requires both that each person respect others and,
reciprocally, that they be respected themselves.
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Laws" and "Freedom from Discrimination." 8 Under the "Equal
Protection" subtitle, the study points out little more than that
"[i]f the state desired to go beyond the federal Fourteenth
Amendment, constitutional wording could be included
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws regardless of sex,
income, or other specific attributes not covered by the
Fourteenth Amendment." 89 Under the second, "Freedom from
Discrimination," subtitle, the study points, in particular, to the
lack of strong federal enforcement of civil rights and the need for
protection against discrimination for women, handicapped
persons, and Native Americans. The study also addressed the
need to provide protection against private as well as state
discrimination. The study noted, for example:
It can be argued that Montana, with a significant and, culturally
speaking, priceless minority population, is especially suited to the
adoption of strong anti-discrimination provisions enforceable by
those affected. This is even more the case given the increasing
cultural awareness and pride of minorities in the state, as 90well as
the legitimate concerns of emerging women's rights groups.

Though this part of the Commission's study never explicitly
refers to human dignity, its focus on women, handicapped
persons, and Native Americans suggests to us a concern for
harms to dignity associated with the distinctive forms of
degrading, discriminatory treatment suffered by these three
groups.
The study also provides, in its appendix, but without
comment, nine examples of "Freedom from Discrimination"
provisions from eight states and Puerto Rico. 91 Only the Puerto
Rican Constitution's provision explicitly includes a dignity
clause, and it is that clause which was included in Proposal 61
and ultimately adopted by the convention.
We did not find any other references to dignity in the
convention's Bill of Rights Study or the convention debate on
this provision. Thus, while the origins of the dignity clause of
the Montana Constitution in the convention history and study
materials do not provide us with any developed analysis of the
clause's precise meaning or scope, they do suggest that there
was nothing arcane or mysterious about the clause's meaning.
Respect for the dignity of individual persons is a fundamental
88.
89.
90.
91.

RIGHTS STUDY, supra note 59, at 308-311.
Id. at 308-09.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 410-11.
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principle of Western political ethics-indeed, among its highest
ideals, and one of the fundamental purposes for which
constitutional democracies are formed.
The convention
delegates apparently wanted to guarantee that the new
Montana constitution protected the ideal of human dignity by
explicitly asserting its inviolability. 92 As to determining the
more specific legal implications of the dignity clause, the
convention delegates appeared to leave that responsibility up to
the Montana Supreme Court.
The convention materials do, however, suggest one
additional source which might be explored to help determine the
meaning of dignity in Article II, Section 4: the legal history of
the Puerto Rican Constitution's dignity clause, which we know
served as the model for our clause.
D. The Puerto Rico Dignity Provision
The dignity provision of the Puerto Rican Constitution
served as the model for the Montana Constitution's dignity
provision.93 Therefore, as a simple matter of constitutional
interpretation one can look to the body of case law interpreting
Puerto Rico's dignity clause, as it existed at the time of the
framing of the Montana Constitution in 1972, to shed light on
what our constitution's framers intended Montana's dignity
clause to mean. In our view, the pre-1972 Puerto Rican case law

92. We contacted by phone Delegate Richard Champoux (the delegate who
introduced Article II, Section 4). Though he served as the Chair of the Education and
Public Lands Committee, and he is justly proud of that committee's work at the
convention, Champoux described the Individual Dignity provision, Proposal 61, which he
drafted and submitted, as the single provision of the 1972 Constitution of which he was
most proud. Champoux confirmed that the dignity clause in his proposal was drawn
from the same provision in the Puerto Rican Constitution, which had been included in
the selected rights provisions of the Bill of Rights Study. When asked about his
intentions for Proposal 61, he spoke eloquently about the influence of his mother, who
strongly believed that men and women should be treated equally and with dignity. As
Champoux explained it, his mother's beliefs reflected, in part, the indignities she had
suffered in the employment markets when she was unable to get a job because she had a
college degree.
He also spoke with deep concern about the degradation of native peoples in
Montana due to discrimination, both by the government and by private persons. When
we asked him specifically about his intentions for the dignity clause, itself, he made it
clear that he thought of the clause as a protection against any treatment which degraded
any persons, but especially that which degraded women and Native Americans. He
simply wanted to assure the dignity of all persons. Telephone Interview with Delegate
Richard Champoux, Drafter, Dignity Provision, Montana Constitutional Convention
(May 2, 2000).
93. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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is entirely consistent with the conception of Montana's Dignity
Provision we have proposed above-that is, a provision designed
to prohibit all infringements upon human dignity, including but
not limited to infringements of equal protection.
Puerto Rico's dignity clause is contained in Article II,
Section 1 of the Puerto Rican Constitution. It reads:
§ 1. [Human dignity and equality; discrimination prohibited]
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. All men are equal
before the law. No discrimination shall be made on account of
race, color, sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or
religious ideas. Both the laws and the system of public education
94
shall embody these principles of essential human equality.

The first thing worth noticing about this section is its
location: It is the very first section of the Puerto Rican Bill of
Rights. This suggests that the authors of the Puerto Rican
Constitution considered dignity to be among the most
fundamental rights which government must respect and protect.
Moreover, like Montana's dignity provision, the Puerto, Rican
provision speaks of both human dignity and equality, although
the exact relationship between the two is not immediately clear
from the text. Finally, like the corresponding section in the
Montana Constitution, Puerto Rico's dignity provision explicitly
prohibits discrimination based on certain classifications,
including one not mentioned in Montana's dignity provision:
birth.
Most of the early cases interpreting Article II, Section 1 of
the Puerto Rico Constitution address this prohibition on
discrimination based on birth. The reason for this appears to be
historical. Prior to the adoption of its constitution in 1952,
Puerto Rico had been slowly doing away with a rule, codified in
a 1911 statute, that illegitimate children were not entitled to
bear their fathers' names or inherit their property.9 5 In a series
of cases, the Puerto Rican Supreme Court upheld a 1952 statute
which provided that the Article II, Section 1 prohibition against
discrimination based on birth would not be applied retroactively
to persons born before the effective date of the constitution, and
therefore illegitimate children born before that date had no right
to inherit a portion of their parents' estate.9 6 In 1963, however,
the court abruptly reversed this holding, finding that the
94. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1.
95. See Ocasio v. Difz, 88 P.R.R. 658, 695-707 (1963).
96. See Correa v. Heirs of Piza, 64 P.R.R. 938 (1945); Marquez v. Aviles, 252 F.2d
715 (1958).
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principle of human equality did not allow the legislature to
discriminate between persons born before and after an arbitrary
date. 97 Remarkably, the court made this ruling despite express
language in the record of the constitutional convention stating
that the framers did not intend for the prohibition on
98
discrimination based on birth to take effect retroactively.
In Gonzdlez v. Superior Court,99 the Puerto Rican Supreme
Court applied the anti-discrimination clause to sex-based
discrimination. That case was brought by a woman whose
family manufactured a highly regarded brand of Puerto Rican
rum. 100 Following her father's death, her brothers refused to
disclose to her the formula for making the rum, insisting that it
was a family tradition that the formula only be passed from
fathers to sons. 10 1 The court ordered her brothers to disclose the
formula to her:
Whatever the family tradition might be, the Constitution of the
Commonwealth does not permit that there be discrimination
between the petitioner and other members of the Estate
(Succession) by reason of sex. The family tradition may be kept
among the heirs and interested parties, but they cannot have the
benefit of the court to make good, against the laws and the
Constitution, a discrimination. 102

Thus, although Puerto Rico's anti-discrimination clause,
unlike Montana's, appears to apply only to state action, the
court in effect extended the ban to private action by holding that
the power of the state is invoked when parties seek to enforce
10 3
private agreements in court.
Finally, and most importantly, in Puerto Rico Urban
Renewal Housing Corporationv. Pena Ubiles' 4 the court made
clear that the dignity right prohibits state actions which infringe
upon human dignity in ways that do not directly involve
discrimination or equal protection. In that case, the court struck
down a lease which provided that the state could evict tenants
from a public housing project on only 15 days' notice. 10 5

97. See Didz, 88 P.R.R. at 708-10.
98. See id. at 708.
99. 97 P.R.R. 788 (1969).
100. See Gonzdlez, 97 P.R.R. at 789.
101. See id. at 790.
102. Id. at 791.
103. This approach has been used only infrequently by the United States Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
104. 95 P.R.R. 301 (1967).
105. See id. at 305.
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Following the "new property" analysis of Justice William
Douglas in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 0 6 the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court found that enforcing the lease as written would
effectively reduce the status of the tenants to that of medieval
serfs, and therefore deny their basic human dignity:
No person, and among those subject to the law of the state itself,
may, by virtue of a contract, set aside or modify in such a fashion
as to be equivalent to the annulment of its juridical rule, any law,
custom, or the public purposes of the political order. The same
could be said about legislation. Laws cannot turn a human being
into a slave, or authorize a confiscatory contract, or alter the
public trust which is the function of every State since it would run
afoul of the luminous sense of our constitutional law wholly
10 7
designed for the protection of the dignity of the human being.

We believe the above cases, taken together, interpreting the
Puerto Rican dignity provision confirm the basic reading which
we propose for Montana's dignity clause: Both provisions, we
think, are intended to guard against all infringements to the
dignity of human beings. Such infringements will sometimes,
08
but not always, come in the form of arbitrary discrimination.
III. LEGAL APPLICATION

A. General Principles
The history of the Puerto Rican Constitution's dignity
clause, the record of the Montana Constitutional Convention,
and our shared Western ethical tradition suggest that there is
nothing mysterious about the Montana Constitution's dignity
clause. The dignity clause refers to the intrinsic worth of
persons, and to the possibility that persons might be violated,
that is, their worth might be degraded. The clause seems to say
that the worth of persons, and the normative principle
prohibiting the violation of persons, is antecedent to the writing
of a constitution, and should be expressed in, and protected by
that constitution.
The difficult problem which remains is
determining how this norm might be applied as a constitutional

106. 386 U.S. 670, 676-80 (1967).
107. UrbanRenewal Hous. Corp., 95 P.R.R. at 305 (emphasis added).
108. We recognize that, if one pushes the idea to its logical extreme, virtually any
dignity claim can be cast in terms of equal protection. For instance, in Thorpe, we could
say that the government "discriminated" against a class which consisted of the tenants of
public housing. We believe, however, that such an analysis, while logically possible, fails
to describe the true nature of the affront to dignity inherent in such action.
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right.
The principal problem with the legal application of this
norm, we believe, is how to define its substantive meaning
specifically and narrowly enough to limit its scope to judicially
manageable principles while remaining consistent with the
ideals of the 1972 Convention as expressed in the other,
complementary, norms included in the Montana Constitution.
In other words, what, exactly, might a constitutional dignity
right protect, and how might that right complement other
protections provided by other rights such as the privacy right or
the speech and religion rights? It is our view that breach of any
of these rights offends human dignity to some extent. What,
then, might the dignity clause itself, be understood to add to
these other rights?
1. Forms of Application
Consistent with the analysis we have offered in Parts I and
II, we believe that the dignity clause most plausibly and
obviously adds a broad spectrum'0 9 protection against treatment
which degrades the worth of individual persons, treatment that
is not otherwise protected by the more specific provisions of the
Declaration of Rights. The dignity right, when applied in this
independent form, fills the gaps between the other norms which
also protect our dignity. We know, for example, that our dignity,
our core humanity, is threatened or compromised if the
government discriminates against us based on some protected
category (non-discrimination); or prevents us from speaking our
minds (freedom of speech) or from practicing our religious beliefs
(freedom of religion); or denies us the opportunity to know about
(right to know) or participate in (right of participation) our
government. If, however, some kind of degrading or demeaning
treatment is not identified with, or encompassed by, any one of
the traditional rights enumerated in the Montana Constitution's
Declaration of Rights, then the requirement that human dignity
not be violated should provide independent protection, assuring
that the worth of each and every human being is always secure.
We also believe that the dignity right can inform,
reciprocally, the meaning and force of some of the other,
especially the more abstract, rights of the Declaration of Rights,
like the equal protection or the privacy rights. Operating in this
109. By "broad spectrum" we mean something comparable in scope to the due
process and equal protection rights.
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way, the application of the dignity right can play a mutually
complementary role, supporting or being supported by the other
right.110
Finally, our tradition assumes that persons are capable of
making autonomous and responsible decisions for themselves
(and in the civic life they share with others), and because the
dignity right seeks to honor this distinguishing capacity of their
humanity, significant breaches of the dignity right may, as we
have noted, supra, be either direct (treatment that overtly and
directly degrades persons), or indirect (treatment that denies
persons the opportunity to direct or control their own lives
which then leads to serious degradation)."'
2. Limitations on Applications of the Dignity Right
Whether applied in an independent or a complementary
form, the scope of the protection provided by the dignity clause
should, we believe, be limited in two ways. First, violations of
dignity should be significant enough to assault the core
humanity of persons by degrading, demeaning, debasing, or
trivializing their worth as human beings.
Inevitably the
Montana Supreme Court will have to decide which violations of
dignity are too trivial to rise to constitutional protection.
Crucial to this determination will be a distinction between the
sort of degradation which dishonors the worth of persons and
the sort of minor indignities we typically associate with bad
manners or personal slights.
Second, if the dignity clause is to maintain its force as a
shared public ethical norm in a liberal, democratic, postReformation and therefore pluralist democracy, the substantive
meaning of the clause must not be identified with, or justified
by, any specific controversial religious or philosophical doctrines.

110. Puerto Rico has applied its dignity clause in just this way. See People v. Rey
Marrero, 109 P.R.Offic. Trans. 985 (1980) (finding that an illegal arrest would violate
several different constitutional rights, including dignity, "the very first provision of our
Bill of Rights .... ).
The precise manner in which the dignity right will complement the other
rights of the Montana Constitution will be very much a reflection of the constitutional
tradition in which the dignity right is found. The German Constitution, for example,
sensitive to the Holocaust experience, treats respect for dignity as limiting freedom of
expression in ways that our more libertarian tradition, reflecting particularly our
experience with "outsider" speech during the civil rights and Vietnam War movements,
would not. This point we owe to law student, Bethany Graham and law professor, Fritz
Snyder at the University of Montana.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
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The only reasonable political compromise we can reach in
modern times (after the Reformation), when we must accept as
fact that different segments of society will have deeply
conflicting personal, religious, and philosophical views about
how one ought to live one's life, is to agree to treat each other,
and our respective values, with mutual respect and tolerance.
This compromise makes possible the modern constitutional
democracy, focused on securing the liberty and protecting the
dignity of each person. Thus, the only conception of dignity that
we can all share as citizens, 112 despite our other differences, in a
post-Reformation state (the conception of dignity that, for
example, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention could
share), must focus on honoring the worth of autonomous
individuals. To remain consistent with this shared, public ideal
of dignity, the right to treatment with dignity must not be
defined according to some parochial, sectarian religious or some
controversial, philosophical notion of human dignity-those
richer conceptions of dignity about which we have agreed to
disagree.
Each of us may, of course, view our own particular lives as
achieving dignity in a richer and more comprehensive sense, i.e.,
in accordance with our own full set of values (e.g., as Roman
Catholics or as "born again" Christians), or our specific systems
of belief (e.g., as feminists), or our rich and integrated culture
(e.g., as Native Americans). We believe it important, indeed
crucial, not to confuse the narrower, more limited, and yet more
fundamental sense of dignity, which the state respects and
which we can all share, from each individual's specific and more
comprehensive conception of a dignified life.
The postReformation state allows us all to share respect for the dignity of
persons as capable of choosing comprehensive conceptions of the
meaningful life. At the same time, the post-Reformation state
cannot allow us to impose upon others, through the mechanism
of the state, our own more specific conceptions of dignity which
reflect our own controversial, comprehensive conceptions of how
life should be lived. Only a shared public meaning for dignity
could make the dignity clause consistent with our postReformation tradition, and of course with the other postReformation rights in the Declaration of Rights that focus on
112. We want to be clear that we are not referring to a majority view of dignity, but
rather a consensus view, that is, one which reasonable persons can share, and which
therefore can form a basis for constitutional principles. For a detailed discussion of the
nature of this post-Reformation consensus, see Rawls, supra note 29.
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tolerance and the autonomy and liberty of persons. 113
In summary, we propose two limitations on the scope of the
dignity right: The first of these limitations we call the
significance requirement. The compromise of dignity must go to
our worth as human beings, must, in other words, be important
and serious. This requirement avoids what might be called
"minor indignities." The second limitation on the scope of the
dignity right we call the secular or public meaning requirement.
When the dignity right is given substantive meaning in any
constitutional context, that meaning must be based on an appeal
to the shared public meaning of dignity, not a sectarian religious
or controversial philosophical meaning.
Finally, we are also suggesting that the dignity right, duly
limited, may be applied either as an independent right or as a
mutual complement to another right. When the violation of
dignity is independent, the protection provided by the right
would come into play only when the affront to dignity is the sole
focus of concern, rather than some other interest protected by
one of the other rights in the Declaration of Rights. When the
dignity right is applied as a complement to another right, the
force of the dignity right will be limited to helping define the
meaning and scope of the other right, or the other right will help
define the meaning and scope of the dignity right. Some
examples of these limitations and forms of application follow.
B. Examples
1. Physician-AssistedSuicide
Perhaps the most likely complementary application of the
dignity clause to an issue that does involve another right in the
Montana Constitution's Declaration of Rights, viz., privacy,
would be to the current prohibition on physician-assisted
suicide. 1 4 It is by now widely understood that modern medical
practice makes it possible for us to maintain the life of an
elderly or terminally ill patient far beyond what had previously

113.
For a detailed discussion of this fundamental idea in liberal, democratic, postReformation theory, see John Rawls, The Idea of PublicReason Revisited, in THE LAW OF
PEOPLES 131-180 (1999). We owe this important limitation on the meaning of the
dignity clause to our friend and colleague, Visiting Professor Steven Kramer of the
University of Montana Philosophy Department.
114. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-102, 45-5-105, 45-2-201 (1999); see also MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-9-205(7) (1999).
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been possible. Very often, however, those who experience or
observe such treatment describe its consequences as undignified,
degrading, and dehumanizing. Consequently, elderly persons
often speak, sometimes with hope, of dying quickly to avoid the
indignities of extended end-of-life medical care, or they speak
simply of dying with dignity.
Their concern, readily
understandable, is with the loss of control over their mental or
physical functions. The indignities of having one's body out of
one's control, or of having that body "serviced" by care givers,
especially when enduring the pain of a terminal illness, can be
quite dramatic and profound. To be forced to suffer those
indignities, when unwanted and unnecessary, seems to us to
violate the basic, core humanity of the sufferer. In short, these
indignities are serious and, therefore, satisfy the significance
requirement. As Ronald Dworkin has noted: "Death is, for each
of us, among the most significant events of life."11 5 To be forced,
against one's wishes, to suffer that event with the loss of the
core functions of our humanity, as can occur with some kinds of
terminal illness, or some kinds of age-related infirmities, seems
at odds with the assertion in the Montana Constitution that
human dignity is inviolable.
Mastery of end-of-life events calls upon individuals to
exercise great courage and great self control. Maintaining one's
dignity in the context of the trauma of these events is no mean
task. Being able to choose the time and circumstances of one's
death, within reasonable constraints, would allow persons the
opportunity to maintain their dignity. Physician assistance in
suicide thus may be necessary to preserve dignity precisely
because a physician can provide the correct, calculated, painless
end to life-a quiet, pain-free passing away at the moment the
patient chooses. The opportunity to make such a choice, thus,
serves the end of human dignity. 116 Not surprisingly, when the
application of the dignity right involves protection of intimate
and personal choices regarding a person's private life, such as a
choice to end one's life, there will frequently also be a right to
privacy issue as well." 7 After all, protecting dignity will often

115. Brief of Amici Curiae of Ronald Dworkin, et al. at 7, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110).
116. But see IRA BYOCK, DYING WELL (1997).
117. The application of Montana's privacy right to physician-assisted suicide is
thoughtfully explained and analyzed in Scott Fisk, The Last Best Place to Die: PhysicianAssisted Suicide and Montana's ConstitutionalRight to PersonalAutonomy Privacy, 59
MONT. L. REV. 301 (1998).
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require the exercise of autonomous control over our own lives,
and interest which is protected by the privacy right."l 8 Our
point here, regarding the complementary application of the
dignity right, is that the focus of concern with physician-assisted
suicide is the preservation of dignity in the dying process. The
exercise of the right to privacy (in the personal autonomy sense),
can become a means to protecting dignity, and protecting dignity
in this context can assure that one of our most important private
choices is secure. 119 The two rights provide complementary
protections.
Reasonable statutory limitations on when such a "private"
choice should be permitted, to assure that the choice serves the
end of dignity, would be thoroughly consistent with this
complementary use of these two constitutional principles. Thus,
reasonable limitations to assure that the choice is fully
voluntary, uncoerced by outside influence or by pathologies such
as depression, would be consistent with the ideal of dignity.
However, an absolute prohibition on physician assistance to end
one's own life may lead to an unnecessarily degrading and
undignified death-a breach of the constitutional ideal of human
dignity.
Finally, the absolute prohibition on physician assistance in
hastening death asserted by various religious conceptions of the
meaning of death, sometimes appeals, in religious terms, to the
preservation of the dignity of human life. Such a view, which is
currently expressed in law in many jurisdictions in the United
States, fails the secular, public meaning requirement because it
fails to respect the limitation that the meaning of individual
dignity must be a public meaning which we can all share. To be
forced into degrading or dehumanizing pain or suffering because
of someone else's conception of a good or proper death
exacerbates the loss of dignity, in the post-Reformation sense.
2. Treatment of Persons under State Supervision
Persons may come under state supervision for a variety of
reasons, e.g., imprisonment for the commission of crimes or
institutionalization for developmentally disabled or handicapped
118. See id. This is a typical indirect application of the dignity right. Government
action does not directly dishonor the dignity of persons, rather it interferes with persons'
autonomy in a manner which can lead to an undignified death.
119. The Montana Supreme Court might have analyzed Gryczan, 283 Mont. 433,
456, 942 P.2d 112, 126 (1997), in just this way using privacy and dignity as
complementary rights.
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persons unable to care for themselves or for persons who are
mentally ill. In each of these instances, the humanity we
presume to lie at the core of every person prohibits treatment
which is demeaning, debasing, or degrading-treatment which
would, in other words, meet the significance requirement of the
120
dignity right.
The vulnerability of the disabled and the mentally ill make
them particularly susceptible to degrading treatment. Though
neither of these groups is specifically protected by provisions in
the Declaration of Rights, members of both groups might seek
protection by invoking the dignity clause. This would be a good
example of the independent application of the dignity right. In
the case of the developmentally disabled, for example, we
provide dignified care when basic human needs for food, shelter,
cleanliness, medical care, and physical and psychological
security are assured, and when the capacities of the
developmentally disabled, physical or mental and however
limited, are provided the opportunity to develop in a manner
which acknowledges the core humanity of this vulnerable group
of persons. 12 1 Programs like the Special Olympics seem to us
particularly forceful expressions of our community's respect for
the dignity of such persons. Similarly, in the case of the
mentally ill, basic human needs must be met, along with
adequate opportunity to develop capacities, and adequate
mental health care must also be provided to treat the illness. It
is natural to speak of the inherent dignity of such
developmentally disabled or mentally ill persons, and to speak of
the requirement that such vulnerable persons be treated with
122
dignity.
For those imprisoned for crimes, complementary application
of the dignity clause would be more appropriate.
The
reformation and prevention functions of punishment both
express the community's disrespect for the actions of the
criminal, but the processes of punishment must never disrespect
the core humanity of the prisoner. Section 22 of Article II

120. It would meet the secularmeaning requirement as well.
121. Failure to provide this care would directly implicate the dignity right, because
such treatment would directly degrade persons.
122. A similar protection might be provided to recipients of welfare or other
government benefits. While procedural protections are provided under the "new
property" principles of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969), the dignity clause could
assure that recipients are treated with dignity in the application for, and administration
of, such benefits.
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prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment on
persons. 123 Section 28 mandates "reformation" as one of the
foundations of punishment for crimes. 124 Part of what these
rights proscribe and mandate should be informed by the
complementary application of the dignity clause. However we
punish, whatever means we use to reform, we must not punish
or reform in a way that degrades the humanity, the dignity, of
the prisoner. Protecting dignity should include, for example,
security from physical harm, including security from sexual
violation, by other prisoners or guards. It should also include
attention to such basic human needs as adequate medical care,
humane rules for visitation, adequate exercise, and adequate
opportunity for education or other capacity-developing activity.
Prisoners may not claim that their punishment, itself, violates
the dignity clause, unless the conditions of that punishment
violate the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition, and that
violation might most easily be elaborated by asking whether the
25
core humanity of the prisoner is being treated with dignity.
3. Two Examples of Discrimination:(1) Against DisabledPersons
and (2)Against Gay Men and Lesbians
The complementary application of the dignity right,
discussed in Subsections 1 and 2 above, demonstrates how the
right might supplement and elaborate a traditional "liberty"
right, like the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. When the dignity right is applied with the equal
protection right, however, its role could be different. In this sort
of complementary application, the dignity right could help us
identify the suspect class, and the degrading, undignified
treatment implicit in the treatment the class receives-the
treatment which deserves the protection of the equal protection
right. The dignity right might be particularly constructive when
classifications reflect animus or prejudice toward traditionally
unprotected groups. Examples can be found in two recent
123. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 22 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, or excessive
fines imposed, or cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.").
124. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28 ("Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded
on the principles of prevention and reformation. . .).
125. The Montana Supreme Court has given the dignity clause a complementary
reading in Matter of C.H., 210 Mont. 184, 201, 683 P.2d 931, 938 (1984). The court held
"that under the Montana Constitution physical liberty is a fundamental right without
which other fundamental rights would have little meaning," referring to dignity, due
process and other rights in the Declaration of Rights. Id.
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United States Supreme Court cases.
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,126 the Court faced
the question of whether a city's refusal to grant a zoning permit,
which would have allowed the siting of a home for the mentally
retarded in a residential neighborhood, was a breach of the
principle of equal protection of the laws. Justice White, writing
for the Court, concluded that denial of the permit reflected the
city's irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, 127 and
thus failed to meet the rational basis test, the lowest level of
equal protection analysis. The other Court members, all of
whom concurred in the outcome, devoted most of their opinions
either to the wisdom of the three tier analysis of equal
protection cases (Justice Stephens, joined by Chief Justice
Burger) or to whether mental retardation should identify a class
which deserves heightened, mid-tier scrutiny because this class
has been subject, in the past, to "segregation and discrimination
that can only be called grotesque" 128 (Justice Marshall, joined by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun). All members of the Court
appeared to recognize both that "[e]xcluding group homes [from
ordinary neighborhoods] deprives the retarded of much of what
makes for human freedom and fulfillment-the ability to form
bonds and take part in the life of the community"129 and that the
city's decision reflected "prejudice" against the retarded, without
exception. However, the attention of each justice focused on the
complexities of equal protection doctrine.
Under the Montana Constitution's dignity clause, a case
like Cleburne might be better analyzed under the dignity right
by our court, focusing on the attack on the core humanity of
retarded citizens implicit in the decision to deny them the right
to participate fully in the community.
Isolation, like
segregation, is degrading, because it says the rest of the
community does not want to share its life with retarded citizens.
The degradation takes the doctrinal form of a failure to provide
equal protection in the application of the zoning permit process.
Focusing on the failure to treat retarded persons with dignity,
together with the "as applied" use of the equal protection right,
helps identify both the class and the degrading treatment which
equal protection prohibits.

126.
127.
128.
129.

473 U.S. 432 (1985).
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
Id. at 461.
Id.
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In an analogous case, Romer v. Evans,130 the Court faced an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution, "Amendment 2," that
precluded any level of state action directed to protecting persons
of "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices, or relationships."' 13
The Court, in striking down
Amendment 2, found that it defied conventional equal protection
32
analysis because it was "at once too narrow and too broad."
As the Court said: "It identifies persons by a single trait and
then denies them protection across the board."133 Because of the
breadth of the disability visited on this class of persons, the
Court described the amendment as "unprecedented in our
jurisprudence" and "as inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects." 3" The Court then concluded, after
reviewing the justification the state offered for the Amendment
2, that the amendment lacked a "rational relationship to a
legitimate government purpose." 135 Thus, while the Court
conceded that it was the state's animus toward the class which
explained the disability imposed by Amendment 2, the Court is,
nonetheless, forced by its own, traditional, tiered analysis to
reject the classification, not as degrading,but as irrational.
Again, under the complementary application of the dignity
clause to the equal protection clause, the analysis of a case like
this would focus on the degradation implicit in the animus
(identified by the Court), an animus so profound as to lead to the
exclusion of a particular group of persons from the democratic
political processes.
Respecting persons' dignity includes
counting them as capable of self-government.
This idea is
essential to democratic government in the post-Reformation
tradition. 36
Denying some class of persons the right to
participate fully in the political process, denying them full
citizenship in their democracy, is an extreme indignity, a failure
to count the members of the class as full citizens.
The
constitutional issue would be better captured by the equal
protection right when complemented by the dignity right than it
would be by focusing on the irrationality of the state's asserted
purpose. The irrationality of the state's asserted purpose in
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

517 U.S. 620(1996).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id. at 632, 633.
See id. at 635.
JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 205-06 (Rev. ed. 1999).
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cases like this often reveals the actual purpose-animus-because
the purpose "cooked up" by the state to rationalize its
classification makes little sense.
In this respect the
complementary application of the dignity clause, with the equal
protection right, might more accurately and sensitively reach
137
the heart of the issue-the animus or the irrational prejudice.
Finally, those who proposed Amendment 2, including the
religiously based Family Life Council in Colorado, might well
attempt to argue that dignity is protected if we prevent gay men
and lesbians from participating in the political processes,
because the state would not then honor, in its laws, their
"undignified life style." The conception of dignity, on which such
arguments rest, appeals to sectarian interpretations of religious
texts like the Bible. Such interpretations of dignity must fail as
interpretations of Montana's constitutional dignity right,
because they fail the secular, public meaning requirement
discussed above.
IV. CONCLUSION

The dignity clause of the Montana Constitution proclaims
one of the fundamental and indispensable political ideals of the
Western democratic political tradition-that the dignity of the
human being is inviolable. The daunting responsibility for
defining the meaning and scope of this grand ideal, for purposes
of its legal application as a constitutional principle, falls to the
Montana Supreme Court. Though invited to address this task in
the briefs in Gryczan, the court, exercising understandable
caution, applied another principle-privacy, with a better
developed meaning and scope. Soon, however, we believe the
court will face an issue, like physician-assisted suicide, in which
the central issue, indeed even the conventional rhetoric of the
issue, demands consideration of the meaning and scope of the
137. A similar analysis could be used, we believe, for the state's denial to same sex
couples the benefits and protections which are granted to opposite-sex married couples.
In a recent decision, the Vermont Supreme Court held that under the Common Benefits

Clause of the Vermont Constitution which guarantees that the government is "instituted
for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people. . ." same-sex couples may
not be denied the benefits and protections which the state's laws provide opposite-sex
married couples. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 874, 888-89 (1999). Again, the
complementary application of the dignity clause with the equal protection clause could
identify the failure to provide equal benefits and protections in Montana law to same-sex
couples as a failure to respect the core humanity of gay and lesbian couples by denying
that they can create, for themselves, the same sort of committed, loving relationships
which heterosexual couples can create.
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dignity clause.
We have tried in this essay to clarify the meaning and role
of the dignity norm in our Western political tradition, viz., that
the dignity of persons commands respect and must not,
therefore, be violated. We have also tried to suggest how the
dignity right might supplement the other rights of the
Declaration of Rights, first, by assuring, in contexts not
identified with the other rights, that the core humanity of
persons is protected, and, second, by complementing and
elaborating the meaning of those other enumerated rights.
Montanans are extraordinarily lucky to have a constitution
with a Declaration of Rights which so clearly and forcefully
articulates the grand ideals of constitutional democracy, such as
dignity, privacy, and the right to know. The burden of "making
good" on the promise of this constitution now falls to attorneys
in the state to raise the appropriate issues, and ultimately to the
Montana Supreme Court to elaborate and institutionalize these
quite glorious rights.
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